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Power system security and reliability has a higher priority in power system operations. 
Power systems are exposed to any failures due to their structures. Preventing any 
unscheduled outage from happening within the power system is impossible, but analyzing 
possible outages in order to predict their consequences is essential. Contingency analysis 
is an important tool in evaluating power system security. It models any single or multiple 
outages to predict power system state variables after them. By analyzing and preparing for 
outages, their consequences can be contained.  
The N-1 contingency which models any single outages of a power system is studied. A DC 
power flow is used to identify critical single line outages, and the selected critical 
contingencies are evaluated in detail by an AC power flow. A DC power flow performance 
in estimating line active power flow is evaluated by an appropriate index. It is shown that 
a DC power flow has an acceptable performance in contingency analysis.  
The main goal of this study is to identify critical double line outages whose outage will lead 
to line flow violations in a power system. This is defined as N-2 contingency analysis. 
Evaluating all possible N-2 contingencies is a huge burden computationally. Identifying 
important double line outages without evaluating all N-2 contingencies by either an AC 
power flow or DC power flow is possible. Screening algorithms are used to identify critical 
outages based on line outage distribution factors and N-1 contingency analysis. The results 
are compared to the ones obtained from full AC power flow. It is shown that these 
algorithms are able to identify a very high percentage of the double line outages that result 
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Chapter 1      
Introduction  
1.1 Background of the Research  
An electric power system consists of generation, transmission and distribution subsystems 
that connects power providers and customers. It is a large and critical infrastructure, and it 
has an essential influence on functioning of society and economy. A big interruption in 
power system, called blackout, affects a large portion of society and creates a lot of 
problems for a huge number of customers that may extend over significant time periods. 
Such disruptions result in direct and indirect losses.  
The complexity and dynamic of power system have been increasing due to the increase in 
renewable resources’ penetration and the maximum loading of the systems to fulfill the 
economic expectations. The security of electrical power system is the first priority in both 
power system planning and operation, and contingency analysis is an important tool used 
to assess security under both topological changes and component failures. Power system 
operators extensively use contingency analysis to decide preventive and corrective control 
actions in power system operation.   
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Contingency analysis is an essential tool to evaluate system security under component 
failures and topological changes. The preventive and corrective control decisions are taken 
based on contingency analysis. To ensure secure operation of the power system, large 
number of contingencies must be considered and analyzed during the power system 
planning and operation [1, 2]. 
The N-1 security criterion is a common standard for assessing the security of power 
systems. According to this criterion, planned power system should withstand against any 
single component failure without any violation in other component constraints while 
supporting all loads in the system. Indeed, N-1 contingency criterion refers to the ability of 
system to move from one stable operation to another without any violation after the 
contingency (the loss of a transmission line or a generator) occurs. 
The N-1 contingency criterion may not be sufficient when multiple component failures take 
place simultaneously. The N-K contingency analysis seems to be inevitable considering 
serious blackouts due to multiple component failures. The N-K contingency criterion 
means that a power system should be able to withstand K component failures 
simultaneously [3, 4]. 
1.2 Objectives of the Research  
The purpose of this thesis is to study the contingency analysis of power system considering 
multiple line outages (N-2 contingencies). The first goal of this research is to study and 
implement existing methodologies for N-1 contingency analysis. An AC power flow and 
various DC power flow models and their applications in power system steady state analysis 
in both normal mode and contingent mode of operations are studied. Active and Reactive 
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Power Performance Indices will be investigated through DC and AC power flow analysis. 
The N-2 contingency analysis and screening methods are investigated next. 
The number of multiple contingencies, even in moderate network, is high. This makes a 
technical challenge to process all possible contingencies in a power system using an AC 
power flow analysis, although it is the most accurate method to analyze a power system in 
steady state operation mode. High speed computers with parallel implementation could be 
a solution to overcome computational constraints. The other way is using a DC power flow 
analysis, a linear model of the power system, in contrast with a nonlinear AC power flow 
analysis in power system contingency analysis. This method is fast but not as accurate as 
the AC power flow method.  
Linear sensitivity factors calculated by a DC power flow are used to estimate power flow 
change in transmission lines due to the change in a power system operation. Power Transfer 
Distribution Factors (PTDFs) estimate line flow changes for a power shift between two 
buses of the system. Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs) estimate line flow changes 
for any line outage in the system. These factors are used to evaluate a power system 
operation after any outage in the system. These are fast but their accuracy depends on the 
system topology and load.  
Contingency screening is an important step in contingency analysis. Through this step, 
contingencies are listed in descending order based on their importance. A transmission line 
whose outage causes severe outages in the system will appear in top of the list. Different 
Performance Indices are used to classify contingencies. Important contingencies are 
identified by a DC power flow analysis. All possible contingencies in the system are 
analyzed using a DC power flow and classified by different performance indices. A few 
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highly ranked contingencies are selected based on their performance indices for further 
analysis using an AC power flow.      
In this research, a DC power flow performance is evaluated in different power operating 
conditions. Distribution Factors and Performance Indices capabilities in contingency 
screening are discussed for both N-1 and N-2 transmission line outages. Different IEEE 
benchmark systems are used to evaluate the performance of the mentioned methods. 
PowerWorld and MATLAB software are used in modeling and simulation of the systems.   
1.3 Organization of the Thesis  
In chapter 2, blackout history of various power systems is discussed. Most important 
blackouts in different continents are explained. Main reasons, corrective actions and 
severity of each contingency are classified.   
Power system steady state is modeled in chapter 3. An AC power flow is modeled and 
analyzed. Various DC power flow models are investigated. Various DC power flow model 
performances in estimating line active power flows are evaluated. Root mean square error 
is used to evaluate various DC power flow models. A DC power flow performance is 
evaluated in comparison to an AC power flow.  
Chapter 4 discusses N-1 contingency for power system. The importance of power system 
security is explained. Sensitivity factors and their application in contingency analysis are 
formulated. Contingency selection and performance indices are explained. Case studies are 
done to evaluate N-1 contingency using different methods.  
Chapter 5 explains N-2 contingency comprehensively. Different contingency selection 
methods for N-2 contingencies are discussed completely. A small system is simulated to 
16 
 
explain strengths and weakness of the discussed methods. In chapter 6, N-2 contingency is 
explained further using a case study.   
The key contributions of the research and suggestions for possible future work are 




Chapter 2  
History of Electrical Power System Blackouts  
2.1 Introduction  
The electrical energy is the most dominant form of energy that is used in all part of the 
world for different kinds of purposes.  It has been used in industrial, commercial, 
transportation and domestic sectors. Imagining the world without electrical energy is 
unbelievable. It has been used in all aspect of human life because of its outstanding 
characteristics. It is produced in generation centers and transferred economically over a 
long distance. It is easy to control electrical energy in comparison to different other forms 
of energy. It has less environmental side effects.   
Safety, reliability and efficiency are three major objectives in power system operations. 
Power system operation is an important task since it can affect people’s life dramatically. 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the basic structure of a power system[5]. Electrical energy is 
produced in generating units, stepped up to higher voltage by transformers, transferred 
through transmission systems, and supplied to costumers by distribution systems. It is better 
to have generating units close to load centers, but the locations for generating units are 
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defined by primary energy resources and environmental concerns. Practically, integrated 
transmission systems connect load centers to the bulk generating units within the country 
or even within the bigger region.  Figure 2.2 shows the time trend for transmission system 
development, and Fig. 2.3 shows the North America interconnected system[5]. 
Interconnected systems have economic, security and reliability benefits[5, 6].  
 
Figure 2.1  Basic structure of an electrical power system 
 
 







Figure 2.3 North America integrated transmission system  
Having a big interconnected transmission system with huge number of generating units and 
transmission lines presents problems due to the natural structure of power systems. The 
loss of any generating or transmitting element can affect other elements’ operation in the 
system. Although nearby elements are affected mostly, an element many hundreds miles 
away can be affected as well. Failure in elements’ operation may lead to a malfunction in 
the whole system operation. The severity of some failures may lead to shut-down in the 
whole system, called blackout. A few catastrophic blackouts have recently occurred in 
different part of the world.  Blackout brings important economic, social and political 
consequences. The insufficient investment in power systems and more complex operation 
regulations of the new deregulated power systems may lead to more blackouts in future [7, 
8].   
Studying power systems’ blackout history helps the power system operators and designers 
to understand reasons and consequences of various critical contingencies in electrical 
power systems. Improvements have been made in designing and operating of power 
systems based on the learnt lessons from various blackouts around the world. In this chapter 
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a few of the most important blackouts in different parts of the world are documented. The 
primary reasons for each blackout, the sequence of events leading to blackout, and 
suggested solution to prevent similar kinds of blackouts for each of the blackouts are 
explained.  
2.2 Blackout History in America  
1) The Northeast power failure on 9th November 1965 in the United States 
This blackout left 30 million people in darkness. This was a major failure in 85 years of 
electrical industries in the United States leaving New York City in darkness for 13 hours 
[9, 10].  
A) Sequence of the events 
 A backup protection tripped one line out of five in heavy loading condition due to relay 
setting for low load level.  
 The other four lines were disconnected following the first line outage.  
 Several lines were overloaded by 1700 MW due to the outages.  
B) The primary causes of the blackout  
 The main cause was the weak transmission line between northeast and southwest. 
 It was also identified that there was not enough spinning reserve kept at the time the 
blackout was initiated. 
C) Proposed solutions  
 Extra High Voltage transmission lines were proposed to be built. 
 Less essential load shedding was introduced for emergency cases.  
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 Keeping distributed spinning reserve was put into practice. 
 
2) The collapse of the Con Edison system on 13th July 1977  
This blackout affected 8 million people for 5 to 25 hours [9].  
A) Sequence of the events 
 Severe thunderstorm and lightning strikes hit lines. 
 Outage of three transmission lines tripped by failed operation of protective equipment.  
 Transmission ties were disconnected due to the overloads caused by forced 
contingencies. 
B) The primary causes of the blackout  
 Equipment malfunction. 
 Questionable system design features. 
 Operating errors as lack of preparation for major emergencies. 
C) Failed actions  
This might have been easily prevented by a timely increase of generation or manual load 
shedding.  
D) Proposed solutions  




 The system was also instructed to operate well within the cautious interpretation of such 
severities. This was mainly achieved using a stopwatch criterion on reducing tie line 
power during thunderstorm periods. 
3) The Western North American power system blackout on 2nd July 1996 
This blackout caused 2 GW power outages leaving cities in darkness [11].  
A) Sequence of the events 
 A short circuit on a 345 KV transmission line, the series compensated line by a capacitor 
with a 1300 km length. 
 Voltage depression due to power transfer loss.  
 Few hydro generator outages due to over load caused by voltage depression.  
 An outage of a 230 kV line tripped by zone 3 relay operation due to the voltage drop in 
load center situated at a distance of 500 km.  
 A small 164 MW peak-to-peak oscillation caused by generator acceleration due to the 
voltage drop.  
B) The primary causes of the blackout  
 Voltage collapse while the generators were operated with exciter limits.  
C) Proposed solutions  
 To prevent this in the future, the defence in depth approach was used. In other words, 
outage detection based stability controls were changed to respond faster, and operating 
limits were investigated and changed. 
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  The zone 3 protection analysis resulted with proposed modern digital controlled 
protection system at power plants to minimize unit tripping for voltage and frequency 
excursions. 
4) The US - Canadian blackout on 14th August 2003 
This blackout covered a wide geographic area and affected about 50 million people. By 
tripping 400 transmission lines and 531 generating units at 261 power plants, 63 GW load 
of the network was interrupted [9, 12].  
A) Sequence of the events 
 Tripping voltage regulator due to over excitation. 
 The generators with high reactive power productions went out when the operators tried 
to restore the regulators.  
 Two 345 KV transmission lines tripped because of a tree contact.  
 A major tie line was tripped by line by zone 3 relay tripping.  This outage led to a 
reversed power flow in the system and hence a cascading blackout of the entire region. 
B) The primary causes of the blackout  
 The major reason was voltage instability due to insufficient reactive power. 
 Inadequate understanding of the system. 
 Inadequate level of situation awareness. 
 Inadequate level of vegetation management. 
 Inadequate level of support from the Reliability Coordinator.   
C) Failed actions  
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 The load shedding might prevent the major tie line tripping if the system monitoring 
software did not fail.  
 If modern excitation was employed it might have saved the generator tripping by 
automatically returning to voltage control mode. 
5) The Brazil blackout on 10th November 2009 
The blackout affected 40 million people, with interrupting 24.436 GW loads[13].   
A) Sequence of the events 
 Phase to ground fault on phase B of a 765 KV transmission line between large 
generating centers in southwestern to the load centers in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.  
 Another single-phase fault on the parallel 765 KV transmission line right after the first 
fault was cleared. 
 Third single-phase fault right after the second single phase fault.  
 High harmonic and dc component due to these single-phase faults disconnected three 
phase shunt reactors.  
 Few 500 KV transmission lines disconnected following the 765 KV transmission lines.  
 Several power plants went out due to voltage collapse.  
 The two HVDC bipoles related to generations with 50 Hz were blocked by under-






2.3 Blackout History in Europe  
1) The Italy System on 28th September 2003 
This blackout was a nationwide blackout, left all Italy in darkness, affected 57 million 
people, and interrupted 24 GW loads [14].  
A) Sequence of the events 
 A heavily loaded Italy-Switzerland tie line was tripped by a tree flashover. 
 Auto re-closer failed to reconnect the line due to a large phase difference across the line. 
 The loss of synchronism, caused by a power deficit in Italy, started with the rest of 
Europe.  
 Distance relay disconnected the interface line between Italy and France.  
 The line between Italy and Austria went out by distance relay operation.  
 The transmission corridor between Italy and Slovenia went out due to overload. 
B) Failed actions  
The frequency decay was not controlled sufficiently to stop generating units from tripping. 
2) The Swedish/Danish system on 23rd September 2003 
This blackout affected 4 million people (in Sweden, 1.6 million people affected and in 
Denmark, 2.4 million people affected) and interrupted 6.55 GW loads. Two 400-kV lines 
and HVDC links connecting the Nordel system with continental Europe and several 
components were out of service due to maintenance. The Swedish failure is a good example 
of unexpected outage when the system was under N-l contingency operation [7, 9]. 
A) Sequence of the events 
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 A 1200 MW nuclear unit in the southern part of Sweden was disconnected. 
 Another 1800 MW power plant was tripped due to fault in the substation because of an 
equipment failure.   
 Voltage collapse due to a high power flow from north to south because of generator 
outages.   
 The system was separated into islanded systems.   
 The islanded systems collapsed in both voltage and frequency. 
3) The Europe system on 4th November 2006 
This was the most sever disturbance in the history of UCTE (Union for the Coordination 
of the Transmission of Electricity) leading to 14.5 GW load interruption and affecting 15 
million people in Europe. The main reason was a planned disconnection of a 380 KV 
transmission line for transportation purpose. This line switching did not happen based on 
analysis. The system was not compatible with N-1 criterion. Different regional transmission 
system operators (TSOs) did not coordinate appropriately during this event [15, 16].    
4)   The Turkey system on 31st March 2015 
This blackout was a nationwide blackout leaving 70 million Turkish people in darkness 
with 32.2 GW unsupplied load. There was no awareness of angular stress of the system in 
control center. The control center was not equipped with a reliable on line contingency 
analysis and off line angular stability tools [17].  
A) Sequence of the events 
 A 400 KV transmission line went out due to the overload.  
 Angular instability was initiated by the line outage. 
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B) The primary causes of the blackout  
 The system was not operating under N-1 criterion. 
 Three 400 KV transmission lines were out of service for construction works and another 
400 KV transmission line was out for maintenance. 
  These planned outages weaken the East to West transmission coordinator. 
  High generation in the east and high load in the west made it hard to keep the system’s 
balance. 
2.4 Blackout History in Asia  
1) The Iran System on 20th May 2001  
The most important blackouts in the history of the Iranian national grid was experienced in 
May 2001 [8, 18]. 
A) Sequence of the events 
 A 400 kV transmission, one of two major lines connecting north part, generation center, 
to the central part of Iran, load center, was disconnected due to short circuit fault while 
the other line was out of service due to annual routine protection tests.  
 Other transmission lines between north and center of the country got overloaded.  
 Two of these lines tripped due to overload leading to an isolation between generation 
center in the north and load center in the capital.  
 The system voltage and frequency dropped due to shortage of energy supply.  




2) The Tokyo System, Japan on 23rd July 1987  
This blackout left 2.8 million customers in darkness with the outage of 3.4 GW power out 
of the maximum power demand of 38.5 GW. The reserve was kept at 1.52 GW and it was 
sufficient to manage the usual demand increase[18].  
A) Sequence of the events 
 Increase in demand (400 MW/minute), unexpected level.  
 High voltage drop due to high demand of power.  
 System collapse due to voltage drop. 
B) The primary causes of the blackout  
 There was an unusual power demand on that day due to extreme hot weather. 
 The rising demand for power was very fast.  
 Air conditioners, constant power characteristic loads, caused a voltage drop and high 
current in the system due to their load characteristics. 
C) Proposed solutions  
 The operators increased the trunk line voltage by 5% of its normal operation during 
summer time. A 1 GW power plant was proposed to be built closer to the load centre. 
 Shunt capacitors together with SVC of 1,550 MVAR were installed.  
 The power transmission route was changed through sub transmission network to 





3) The Indian System on 30th and 31st July 2012  
This blackout was the largest one in the world affecting 620 million people. Three of Indian 
grids failed to supply their customers on 30th and 31st. Nine states of Northern India went 
dark on 30th July with approximately 3.6 GW of load. Another disturbance hit Indian 
network on 31st July leading to a blackout, which covered almost the entire system. 4.8 GW 
load were disconnected affecting more than 700 million people life.  
 Relay malfunction and incorrect setting, high reactive power consumption and high load 
demand due to high temperatures were possible reasons for the disturbances. Transmission 
system was weak due to few outages, and the tie line between western and northern region 
was overloaded due to high demand in northern region. Zone 3 of distance relay separated 
these regions without any fault in the system. Indian electrical system suffers from high 
power losses in its transmission and distribution systems [19, 20].  
A) The primary causes of the blackout  
 Weak transmission system due to multiple outages.  
 Tie line overload between north and west because of high demand in western region. 
 Separation of north and west reason due to zone 3 relay operation.  
4) The Pakistan System on 24th September 2006  
This blackout left 160 million people in darkness. The whole system was affected by the 
disturbance and 11.11 GW load was disconnected. Small signal instability and voltage 
instability were the main reasons for the blackout. A 500 KV transmission line was out for 
maintenance, the other two parallel 500 KV transmission lines were uncompensated and 
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loaded close to their stability limits. The system was operating to its stability limit, and 
there was no stability margin in the system for any contingency condition [21].  
2.5 Summary of Global Blackouts  
Table 2.1 shows blackout data for different countries. The number of affected people, the 
amount of interrupted loads and the date for studied cases are summarized in the table. The 
Indian blackout was the worst one affecting 620 million people. The North America 
blackout in 2003 was the biggest based on the interrupted loads, affecting 50 million 
people.  






Figure 2.4 Affected people by blackouts in different part of the world 
 
 





Affected people in million
United States, Canada United States United States, Canada
Turkey India Brazil
Europe Pakistan Italy









Intruppted loads in GW
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2.6 Summary  
Designing and operating a power system without any failure are impossible. 
Operator mistakes, component failures, and natural incidents make power systems 
vulnerable. This chapter has reviewed a few important blackouts around the world 
indicating that power system blackouts are a part of these systems, and while they 
cannot be avoided, they should be managed to control their frequency and severity. 
Investment in power system infrastructures, implementation of new and advanced 
technologies to monitor and control a power system, detail analysis of a power 
system steady state and dynamics in different mode of operation, and consideration 
of new rules regarding system security in planning and operating of a power system 







Study of DC Power Flow Analysis Methods for Power Systems 
3.1 Introduction 
The long and short-term operation planning of power systems, in a way that systems could 
be able to provide efficient, economical as well as reliable energy to customers, is a difficult 
task for power system operators and researchers. The power flow study is both an important 
and a necessary tool for power system’s planning and operating evaluation. The power flow 
is a steady state analysis of balanced three phase power systems. It gives voltage amplitude 
and angle as an output at each bus of the system, and hence active and reactive power flows 
in the transmission lines. Moreover, it gives valuable information about power system 
conditions. The results of the power flow analysis are used to evaluate and control a power 
system both technically and commercially. Some practical applications of the power flow 
analysis are [2, 22-24]:   




 Contingency analysis: to test how transmission line or generator outages may influence 
system operation.  
 Reactive power (VAR) compensation and voltage profile: to determine the value and 
location of compensators, and to evaluate their effectiveness.  
 Transfer capability analysis: to test for inter utility power transfer limits. 
 Online control and security enhancement: to analyze the effectiveness of corrective 
measures to alleviate emergencies. 
Nonlinear power flow equations, known as AC power flow, in contrast with linear power 
flow equations, known as DC power flow, are the accurate models for power systems in 
steady state mode of operation. Although the AC power flow is accurate, convergence 
difficulty and convergence speed limit make it nonfunctional in some applications. A power 
system operating condition changes constantly, so its estimator should be fast enough to 
estimate its condition in short time with satisfactory accuracy. A power system operation 
under forced outages should be evaluated fast. A contingency analysis evaluates system 
states under outages, which can be done by using either an AC or a DC power flow; it also 
can be done with a linear sensitive analysis. A contingency analysis by AC power flow 
evaluates system states correctly but slowly. The result is nonfunctional since the power 
system operating condition changes rapidly. A contingency analysis by DC power flow, 
which is fast but not as accurate as the AC power flow, is the solution [2, 22-26].  
A DC power flow is used in online contingency analysis, meanwhile inaccurate results may 
cause serious problems like blackout and voltage collapse, in the worst case [27]. A DC 
power flow, or a MW only power flow, is a popular method in power system analysis with 
35 
 
an application in a contingency screening, transmission loading relief, transfer analysis and 
long term transmission planning. The linear, non-complex, and often state-independent 
features of the DC power flow make it interesting from analytical and computational point 
of view. Compared to the AC power flow, its advantages are [26]:  
 Non-iterative, reliable and unique solutions.  
 Simplicity of models and software.  
 Can be solved and optimized efficiently, especially in contingency analysis.  
 Minimum network data requirement.  
 Conformity with economic theory because of its linearity.  
 Acceptable accurate line active power flow approximation.  
In summary, this chapter explains power system steady state modeling and analysis using 
both the AC and DC power flow methods. Section 3.2 presents a general overview of an 
AC power flow modeling and analysis procedure. Section 3.3 demonstrates a DC power 
flow analysis comprehensively. A classical DC power flow and its other forms are 
formulated in this section. Case studies are done in section 3.4 to evaluate a DC power flow 
performance in three different networks. Section 3.5 gives a summary of the chapter. 
3.2  AC Power Flow Analysis 
A four-bus system is considered, as shown in Figure 3.1, to demonstrate and formulate a 
power flow problem. Each bus has both a generator and a load, and the transmission lines 
are considered as medium length lines with a π model. The node-voltage analysis can be 
written as Equation (3.1) based on Figure 3.1. The goal of a node-voltage analysis method 




Figure 3.1 Four bus system single line diagram and its equivalent model 
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where:  
  I: line injected current vector. 
 Ybus: Admittance matrix of the system.  
V: Bus voltage vector.  
Ybus Matrix is ‘n’ by ‘n’ matrix, ‘n’ is the number of system buses, and equals:  
 sum of connected admitances to bus p                                            p=q








In the power system analysis, because the injected current vector is a phasor parameter, and 
the angle of the currents is not available, therefore a complex power vector is used as an 
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Power flow equations (3.4-3.6) are nonlinear, and should be solved using iteration 
techniques. The Gauss Seidel and Newton-Raphson (NR) methods are two well-known 
methods, used in power flow analysis. 
 The Gauss Seidel method: simple and easy to compute, has long convergence time, and 
used as an initial solution for the Newton-Raphson method.  
 The Newton Raphson method: used in large power systems, and has fast convergence 
time. This method is divided into two Cartesian and polar categories. The speed of 
convergence is limited in the Cartesian method; however, the polar method leads to a 
faster method named the Fast Decoupled Newtown Raphson (FDNR). The NR and 
FDNR techniques are widely used in commercial power flow software packages [24, 
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25]. Using the polar NR method, the calculated active and reactive injected power are 
presented in Equations (3.7-3.9).  
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Every bus has two equations, but four unknown variables. Therefore, buses are divided into 
three groups based on their known and unknown parameters:  
 Slack bus: The voltage magnitude and angle are known while the active and reactive 
powers are determined by power flow equations. Any system has just one slack bus, and 
it is responsible for system losses in regulated networks. It is a fast power plant, which 
is responsible for power conservation of the power system in order to prevent frequency 
variation in the power system.  
 PQ bus: The active and reactive powers are known, and the voltage magnitude and angle 
are calculated. Most of the power system buses are PQ buses. 
 PV bus: This is a generator-connected bus. The generator keeps the bus voltage 
amplitude constant. The active power of the bus is known, and the reactive power and 
voltage angle are calculated by power flow equations.  
3.2.1 AC Power Flow Equations  
1) Slack bus: The voltage magnitude and angle are known, and the injected active and 
reactive power are calculated using Equations (3.10-3.11).  
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2) PV bus: The injected active power and voltage magnitude are known, and the voltage 
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3) PQ bus: The injected active and reactive power are known, and the voltage amplitude 
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Table 3.1 Power flow analysis summary 
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3.2.2 AC Power Flow Solution Procedure 
As explained in the previous section, the voltage magnitude and angle are determined for a 
slack bus, and its active and reactive power can be calculated using Equations (3.10-3.11), 
right after power flow analysis of the system is done. The voltage magnitude of the PV 
buses is determined as well, and the equations in (3.12b) are true while the reactive powers 
are within the defined constraints. The PV bus should be considered as a PQ bus when its 
reactive power violates the constraints defined by the generator capability and system 
stability concerns. Therefore, the reactive power of each PV bus should be checked against 
its constraints in any iteration of the power flow analysis. To accomplish the power flow 
analysis of the system, Equations (3.12a, 3.13a, and 3.13b) should be executed using 
iterative methods. The state variables are the voltage angle for all buses except the slack 
bus, and the voltage amplitude for the PQ buses. Equations (3.16-3.18) explain how to 
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Where:   
00 0   &   1 pu i iV    (3.19) 
3.3   DC Power Flow Analysis 
A power system analysis using DC power flow determines generators’ dispatch and lines’ 
active power flow, which are important variables in some applications such as electricity 
market and contingency analysis [27]. 
Classical DC power flow equations are derived from AC power flow formulations based 
on the following assumptions: 
 Reactive power conservation is not considered. 
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 Line power loss is neglected.   
 Voltage magnitude is considered one per unit.   
 Small voltage angle difference between buses is considered.  
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(3.20)        
Based on the first assumption, the voltage angle is determined by an active power 
conservation ignoring the reactive power influence on the voltage angle which may lead to 
a considerable error. Ignoring the active power losses of transmission lines may lead to a 
substantial error, especially in a power system with high resistance to reactance ratio and 
with high loads. Therefore, the classical DC power flow is a good estimator for line active 
power flow if its assumptions are accurate. Overall, there is an accuracy concern for the 
DC power flow method. Several DC power flow methods have been investigated in order 
to modify the inaccuracy of the classical method. These methods are classified into two 
general categories [26-29]:  
 Hot start models. 
 Cold start models. 
The hot start, or state-dependent model, is based on the initial operating point obtained from 
the AC power flow analysis. The DC power flow formulation is a linear approximation 
around the initial operating point. Line active power losses are calculated using an initial 
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operating point, and they remain constant as a load in the DC power flow analysis. The new 
reactance of transmission lines reflect the effect of voltage magnitudes in DC power flow. 
The satisfactory accuracy of this model in estimating the line power flow has been proved 
[26]. It should be mentioned that an error in this model depends on the initial operating 
point, so it grows when the operation point goes away from the initial operating point.   
The cold start, or state-independence method, considers a one per unit voltage magnitude 
for all buses, and either ignores or approximates line power losses since there is no available 
initial operating point in this method. Indeed, the loss approximation method is more 
accurate than lossless method, but still there is a big concern of inaccuracy. The classical 
DC power flow is classified in the cold start category. Furthermore, ignoring the reactive 
power conservation and the flat voltage assumption are two important deficiencies for both 
hot and cold start methods. A new approach of cold start DC power flow has been proposed 
in [27] which considers both the reactive power conservation and the voltage profile effect 
on the voltage angle.   
3.4 DC Power Flow Equations 
a) Hot Start model 
This method is useful when the initial operating point of the system is available either by 
the AC power flow analysis or by phasor measurement units (PMU). A single AC line 
between two buses and its DC equivalent model are shown in Figure 3.2. A line loss 
obtained from AC analysis is modeled as constant loads in the buses, and the effects of 




Figure 3.2 Line model and its DC equivalent 
 
It should be noted that in a hot start model, the line power losses and the voltage magnitude 
of buses are dependent on the initial operating point; therefore, their effects should be 
updated to consider the change of operating point. It takes time to consider the change of 
operating point.  
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Another approximation for hpqis: 
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b) Cold Start model  
The cold start, or state independence, is used since there is no reliable operating point in 
some applications such as long term planning studies. The cold start model is categorized 
in two groups:  
 Classical DC power flow: A well-known DC model based on four assumptions: ignoring 
the reactive power conservation, considering a flat voltage for buses, ignoring line power 
losses, considering a small difference in voltage angles between buses. Equation (3.20) 
explains this model.  
 DC power flow model with loss compensation: the only difference between this model 
and the classical one is the compensation of the line active power losses by modifying 
the loads. The loads are modified by multiplying them with a constant. A single 
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multiplier is equal to a ratio of the active power generated in the system to the active 
power consumed by the loads in the system. Line active power losses are distributed 
between loads arbitrarily. This method shows a better performance compared to the 
classical method.    
3.4.1 Different DC Power Flow Methods Execution Procedures   
This section gives a detailed analysis procedure for six different DC power flow methods. 
Each method and its assumptions are discussed. The differences between the models are 
explained through case studies in the next section.   
a) Classical DC power flow used in MatPower software (MP) [30] 
The MP DC power flow analysis is based on Equation 3.16. The MP result is used as a base 
to evaluate the accuracy of the other DC power flow methods studied in this chapter.  
b)  Classical DC power flow with zero line resistance (DC, r=0) 
This method uses Equation 3.16 to accomplish the power flow analysis. The resistance of 
each line is considered zero.  
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c) Classical DC power flow with a zero line conductance (DC, g=0) 
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This method is a classical DC power flow with line conductance equals to zero instead of 
line impedance. Equations (3.30-3.31) demonstrates the difference between the method and 
the previous one.  
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d) Single multiplier DC power flow with zero line resistance (DC, SM r=0) 
The loss of the transmission line is not considered in the three mentioned methods. 
However, this method tries to compensate for the power loss of the transmission lines by 
distributing the losses between buses as loads arbitrarily. The single multiplier (SM) is 
equal to the ratio of the active generated power in the system to the active consumed power, 









Table 3.3 shows this factor for three different systems studied in this chapter. 
Table 3.2 Single multiplier factor (SM) 
 7-bus system 39-bus system 118-bus system 
SM 1.01 1.007 1.03 
 
 
e) ingle multiplier power flow with zero line conductance (DC, SM g=0) 
This method is the same as the previous one, except that the conductance of the 
transmission lines is considered zero.   
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f) Hot start DC power flow 
The hot start DC power flow starts with an initial operating point obtained from AC power 
flow analysis. This method and its formulation are discussed in section (3.3.1).  
3.5  Case Studies 
This section compares the accuracy for different DC power flow models by comparing each 
of them to the AC power flow through the case studies. Three systems with 7, 39 and 118 
buses are investigated. A summary of the systems is presented in Table 3.2 and the detailed 
data for these systems is given in the Appendix A. The simulations are executed in 
MATLAB and MATPOWER (MP) [31]. The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) is used as 
an index to compare various DC power flows with the AC power flow. The RMSE is a 
frequently used measure of the difference between values. The RMSE of a model with 

















where: 𝑋𝐴𝐶 represents AC values, and 𝑋𝐷𝐶 represents DC values. 
Table 3.3 Summary of studied systems 
 7 bus system 39 bus system 118 bus system 
Generation MW 767.9 6191.3 4374 
MVAr 103.2 837.3 793.9 
Load MW 760 6149.5 4242 
MVAr 130 1408.9 1438 
Shunts MW 0 0 0 
MVAr 0 -342.7 -84.4 
Losses MW 7.9 41.8 132.5 
MVAr -26.8 -228.9 -559.7 
Number of Generators 5 10 54 
Number of Loads 6 31 99 





Table 3.4 Root mean square error of 7-bus system 










































As shown in Table 3.4, the root mean square error (RMSE) of voltage magnitude is the 
same for different power flow methods since voltage amplitudes of buses are considered 
one per unit. However, for the voltage angle, the dc hot start, the dc power flow with zero 
resistance, the dc power flow with single multiplier and zero resistance, the dc power flow 
with zero conductance, and the dc power flow with single multiplier and zero conductance 
have small root mean square error respectively. For the line active power flow, the dc power 
flow with single multiplier and zero resistance has the smallest RMSE while the dc hot start 
model has the highest error. Figure 3.3 explains these interpretations using bar graphs. 
Figure 3.4 shows the voltage magnitude and angle for buses and the active power flow of 
lines for both AC and DC power flows. The dc power flow with a single multiplier and 








Figure 3.4 Voltage magnitude and angle and line active power flow of a 7-bus system for different kind 
of power flow analysis 
For the 39-bu system the dc hot start has the smallest root mean square error and the 
classical dc with zero conductance has the biggest for voltage angle, as shown in Table 3.5. 
The RMSE of the line active power flow is the smallest for the dc with single multiplier 
and zero resistance and the biggest for the dc hot start model. Figure 3.5 demonstrates 
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RMSE using bar graphs. Figure 3.6 shows the voltage magnitude and angle of buses and 
the active power flow of lines for both AC and DC power flows. The dc power flow with 
single multiplier and zero resistance is the best estimator of the line active flow for a 39-
bus system based on RMSE index.  Voltage magnitude is considered one per unit for all 
DC power flow methods.  
Table 3.5 Root mean square error of a 39-bus system 






















































Figure 3.6 Voltage magnitude and angle and line active power flow of a 39-bus system for different 
kinds of power flow analyses 
The RMSE of the voltage angle is the smallest for the dc hot start and the biggest for the 
classical dc power flow with zero resistance, as shown in Table 3.6 for the 118-bus system. 
For line active power flow, dc power flow with single multiplier and zero resistance has 
the smallest RMSE while the dc power flow with zero conductance has the biggest one. 
The RMSE values for different methods are shown in Figure 3.7. The voltage magnitude 
and angle of buses and the active power flow of lines for both AC and DC power flows are 
shown in Figure 3.8. The dc power flow with a single multiplier and zero resistance is the 
best estimator of the line active flow for 118-bus system considering the RMSE as an 
indicator.   
Table 3.6 Root mean square error of a 118-bus system 
 DC MP DC r=0 DC g=0 DC SM r=0 DC SM g=0 DC hot start 










































Figure 3.7  Root mean square error of voltage magnitude and angle and line active power flow of a 
118-bus system (numbers in X axis stand for different discussed power flow methods) 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Voltage magnitude and angle and line active power flow of a 118-bus system for different kinds 






3.6 Summary  
In this chapter, the steady state modeling and analysis of the power system based on both 
AC and DC power flow are discussed comprehensively. Various DC power flow methods 
are explained and formulated.  The AC power flow is the accurate model of the system in 
steady state mode of operation, while the DC power flow is a linear approximation of the 
system in this mode of operation. The DC power flow is fast, and it is useful for online 
applications such as contingency analysis in power systems. As explained, the DC power 
flow accuracy varies for various power systems and loading conditions and depends on the 
considered assumptions for various DC power flow methods. Three systems are simulated 
to evaluate the different DC power flow methods. The DC power flow with single 
multiplier and zero line resistance has the best performance in estimating line flows for all 
three systems. Root mean square error index is used to evaluate the performance of  the 
various methods. Line flows obtained from a DC power flow are compared with those 
obtained from an AC power flow. Small values of root mean square errors for various 
systems indicate that the DC power flow could estimate line active power flows.  
Estimating line flows is an important task in contingency analysis. Therefore, the DC power 






N-1 Contingency Analysis for Power Systems  
4.1 Introduction 
Power system reliability has a higher priority in power system operations, especially in 
large interconnected modern power systems with the possibility of widespread blackouts. 
A power system should operate economically and should be designed according to 
reliability constraints. Power systems should have enough generation systems to meet the 
loads and adequate transmission lines to deliver the power from the generators to the loads. 
Power systems should operate reliably if there is no component failure in the system. 
Furthermore, power systems should be designed so that they are able to operate with no 
violation in their constraints when there is a component failure on the system, based on the 
N-1 contingency rule.  
Power systems are huge manmade structures, which are exposed to different failures 
because of either internal or external causes, such as short circuit or bad weather condition. 
Building a power system with a redundancy that covers all possible failures is impossible, 
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but designing a power system with sufficient redundancy that covers major failures 
enhances power system security and reduces load-dropping probability. Power system 
reliability should be checked frequently since operating conditions of the system change 
constantly. Transmission line and generator unit outages are the most common failures in 
power systems. Transmission line failures change power flows of the remaining lines and 
bus voltages. 
 In order to do preventive and corrective actions when line outages take place, line flows 
and bus voltages for any specific outage should be estimated. When a generator outage 
takes place in the power system, not only the transmission lines but also the other generators 
experience changes in their operating conditions. When the generation unit fails, the 
balance between loads and generators is violated, and therefore the power system frequency 
drops. To recover the frequency, the missed generated power should be taken by the 
remaining generators, provided they are operating within their maximum output 
constraints. If the remaining generators are not able to compensate the deficiency, load 
shedding will take place to restore power system frequency. To prevent this, generators 
should be operated so that the sum of unoccupied capacity, called spinning reserve, to make 
up the loss is greater than the largest generator’s capacity in the power system. A 
transmission line outage or a transformer outage may lead to a violation in line flows or 
bus voltages. Any failure may lead to the worst violation in the system operation, therefore 
evaluation of all failures is desirable but impossible. Overall, operators check possible 




4.2 Contingency analysis  
Outages can influence active and reactive power losses on transmission lines. As shown in 
Equations (4.1-4.2), the active and reactive power losses depend on line currents (𝐼𝑙). 
Therefore, any change in line flow will lead to a change in active and reactive power loss 











Q x I   (4.2) 
where 𝑅𝑙 and 𝑥𝑙 are line 𝑙 resistance and reactance.  
Reactive power losses in transmission lines affect voltages. Transmission lines consume 
reactive power (𝑄𝑙), as shown in Equation (4.2), and produce reactive power (𝑄𝑔𝑒𝑛), as 
shown in Equation (4.3).  
  2 2
 lines l
gen capl sl capl rl
all
Q B V B V    (4.3) 
where 𝐵𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑙, 𝑉𝑠𝑙 and 𝑉𝑟𝑙 represent line susceptance and sending and receiving end voltages, 
respectively.  
Contingency analysis defines which transmission line outage or generator outage will lead 
to a violation in the line flows or bus voltages. Contingency analysis models any single 
outages and multiple outages to predict system states. The line flows and bus voltages are 
checked against their limits in the contingency analysis. The convergence speed of 
contingency analysis is important because the number of contingency is extremely high in 
large power systems, and the power system operating condition changes constantly. 
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 Contingency analysis using a DC power flow estimates line flow accurately and rapidly, 
since bus voltages are not a big concern in many systems. However, bus voltages are a 
concern in other systems. That means contingency analysis using an AC power flow is 
required in order to predict the system states after a specific outage. It should be mentioned 
that each outage does not lead to a violation in system limitations, and it is impossible to 
accomplish AC power flow analysis for each outage quickly. Contingency analysis using 
AC power flow is both unnecessary and impractical. Contingency screening or contingency 
selection is a procedure by which the important contingencies are selected using a DC 
power flow, and then the selected contingencies are evaluated by an AC power flow 
comprehensively [28].  
4.3 Linear Sensitivity Factors 
Linear sensitivity factors, derived from a DC power flow, are used to calculate line active 
power flows quickly. These factors show changes in the line active power flows when the 
system operating condition is changed. These factors are divided into two categories [32-
34]:  
 Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs) 
 Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs) 
4.3.1 Power Transfer Distribution Factors 
Power transfer distribution factors explain how the active power flow on line l changes 
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The new active power flow for each of the lines of the system can be calculated by using 
predetermined PTDFs, as shown in Equation (4.5). 
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The new flow (
^
lf ) on each line is compared against its limit (
max
lf ) and the alarm is 
announced for a violation. The line flow 
^





because a line flow direction is not considered power flow calculation. The line flow may 
reversed due to an outage in the system. The superposition theory is used in the case of 
simultaneous generator outages since the PTDF factors are linear.  
4.3.2 Line Outage Distribution Factors 
Line outage distribution factors (LODFs) calculate the line active power flow changes 
when the line outages take place in a power system, as shown in Equation (4.6). Figure 4.1 
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Figure 4.1 Flow change on line l due to an outage of line k  
 
LODFs, which depend on system parameters and structures, are pre-calculated and stored. 
Therefore, the post contingency flow in line l  is calculated by Equation (4.7), provided the 
flow of the line is known for pre-contingency, which is either obtained by state estimation 
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where:
,   flow on line  and line  before outage, respectively 









The PTDFs and LODFs are independent from a power system operating condition. They 
are related to transmission line parameters and system topology.  Therefore, by pre-
calculating these factors, the line active power flows can be quickly checked against their 
limits in case of line or generator outage. Contingency analysis procedure using sensitivity 
factors involves the following tasks:   
 Calculating PTDFs and LODFs factors based on the transmission line parameters.  
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 Evaluating the pre-contingency operating condition of the power system. 
 Calculating line active power flow using Equation (4.5) for each line of the system when 
power is transferred from one bus to another bus in the system.  
 Calculating line active power flow using Equation (4.7) for each line of the system when 
any other line fails.  
 Initiating an alarm in case of line flow violation due to an outage. 
4.4 Formulation of PTDFs and LODFs  
4.4.1 PTDF Formulation 
An active power ( P ) is transferred from the sending bus (bus s ) to the receiving bus (bus
r ), as shown in Figure 4.2. PTDF gives a fraction of the transferred power flowing on line
l , as shown in Equations (4.8-4.10).    
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The bus angles are the system states when the system is modeled based on DC power flow. 
The voltage magnitude is considered one per unit and the voltage angle is calculated by the 
active power conservation in the system. Equation (4.11) explains the voltage angle 
changes for a one MW power transferred from bus s to bus r .  
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As shown in Equation (4.14), PTDFs depend on the system parameters and they are 
independent of the system operating condition. The reference bus is not considered in 
Equation (4.11), so the reactance between the slack bus and the other buses should be 






4.4.2 LODF Formulation 
LODFs formulate a change in line active power flow when a line outage takes place in the 
system. LODFs estimate the active power of line l  when line k  fails, as shown in Figure 
4.3 [2].  
 
Figure 4.3 Flow change on the line l  when the line k out 
PTDFs are used to formulate LODFs. The line outage is simulated as a power change in 
the sending and receiving end of the line, as explained in Figure 4.4 [2]. The original active 
power flow in line k  is nmP , and the flow changes to 
~
nmP , after nP  and mP  are injected 
into bus n  and bus m  respectively. Line k  outage can be simulated by Equation (4.15). 
All of the injected power into bus n  flows through line k . The power on line k  does not 
flow through circuit breakers, and the line is open.   
 
~ ~      n nm m nmP P and P P      (4.15) 
The active power flow of line k  due to power injections on bus n  and bus m  is calculated 
in Equations (4.16-4.17), based on PTDFs.  
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Equation (4.18) relates the flow change on line l  to the original flow on line k , so the 












    (4.19) 
 
^





Figure 4.4 Line outage modeled as injections in sending and receiving buses  
4.4.3 Compensated PTDF  
The compensated PTDFs are defined to consider the power transfer from one bus (bus s ) 
to the other bus (bus r ) with simultaneous line outage (line k ) on the power system. The 
flow on line l  due to line k  outage is defined, as shown in Equation (4.20). The new flow 
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 (4.22) 
The power flow on line l  due to power transfer from bus s  to bus r  and line k  outage is 
written as Equation (4.23). The superposition theory is used since these factors are linear. 
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(4.23) 
The compensated PTDFs are expressed as:  
 , , , , ,
 s r l l k s r kPTDF LODF PTDF   (4.24) 
4.5 Contingency Ranking and Selection 
PTDFs and LODFs estimate the line active power flows with a satisfactory accuracy when 
there is a generator or line outage in the system. These factors ignore voltage magnitudes 
and hence reactive power flows in the system. In some power systems, reactive power flow 
has a significant effect on the system operating condition, and an active power flow is not 
a sufficient indicator of line flow overloads. In these cases, distribution factors are not 
qualified methods to estimate the line overloads, and an AC power flow implementation is 
inevitable. By using an AC power flow analysis for power system contingency evaluation, 
the big concerns arise regarding the speed of the solution and hence the number of 
contingencies which could be considered. Although evaluating each of the outages using 
an AC power flow analysis gives an accurate solution for line flow and voltage limit 
violations, it takes too long to be accomplished. The dilemma of choosing between the fast 
and approximate methods, distributions factor methods, and the accurate and slow method, 
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AC power flow method, can be solved by combination of the various approaches. 
Contingency analysis procedure by combined methods involves the following tasks: 
 Selecting the contingencies with high possibility of causing overloads using distribution 
factors.  
 Evaluating the selected contingencies for an accurate line flow or bus voltage limit 
violations using AC power flow analysis. 
All outages are ranked based on performance indices in a descending order by using 
sensitivity factors. A few of the outages are evaluated by an AC power flow to estimate not 
only the line active power flows with higher accuracy but also the line reactive power flows 
and bus voltages. The performance indices (PI) are important factors in contingency 
ranking. They should be chosen in a way that the severity of a specific contingency is 
highlighted correctly. The final list of critical contingencies for the AC power flow analysis 
is prepared based on performance indices. It is expected that all of the important 
contingencies are placed in this list by performance indices while unimportant 
contingencies are excluded by them. In general, the PI can be classified into two groups. A 
suitable combination of these two groups is considered too.   
 Active power based ranking methods: the change in line active power flows is 
considered. 
 Reactive power or voltage security based ranking methods: the change in line reactive 
power flows or bus voltage variations are considered. 
4.5.1 Active Power Based Ranking 
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This index tends to rank a contingency which leads to many heavily loaded lines and no 
overloaded lines in the system higher than a contingency which leads to a few overloaded 
lines and some lightly loaded remaining lines. This problem can be solved by considering 
only the overloaded lines in Equation (4.27) instead of all lines. The other problem in using 
Equation (4.27) is that the contingency with many slightly overloaded lines may be ranked 
higher than a contingency with some heavily overloaded lines, while the second case is 
severe than the first one. To overcome this problem, a two term PI can be used as explained 






















 the change in power flow in the highest overloaded line.






In the contingencies with the same highest overloaded lines, the effect of the second highest 
overloaded lines should be taken into account in Equation (4.28). 
4.5.2 Reactive Power or Voltage Security Based Ranking 
There are some PIs used for ranking the contingencies based on a reactive power or a 
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4.6 Case Studies  
In this section, N-1 contingency is evaluated based on performance indices for IEEE 7 and 
39 benchmark systems. Table 4.1 shows N-1 contingencies for 7-bus system screened by 
active power flow performance index based on Equation (4.27). Active power flow and 
voltage performance indices are shown in column three and four respectively. Line 1 has 
the highest power flow performance index indicating that this line is the most important 
contingency in the system. Based on the performance index, an outage on line 1 leads to 
overloads in the remaining lines of the system. Line 9 and 6 have performance indices 
greater than 1 which means their outages may lead to overloads in the system. These three 
lines are considered critical contingencies. They are evaluated in detail using an AC power 
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flow to identify their outages consequences. The AC power flow analysis shows that line 1 
outage causes an overload in line 2, as shown in Figure 4.5. Table 4.2 demonstrates root 
mean square errors (RMSE) between the AC and DC power flow analysis for different N-
1 contingencies. The RMSE value differs for various contingencies in the system. It has its 
minimum value when the system operates without any contingency and its maximum value 
when the system operates under line 9 outage. The RMSE clarifies line active power flow 
differences between the AC and DC power flow analysis in different mode of operation 
(section 3.5).  
 

















Non - - 1.8521 
1 1 2 3.4428 
2 1 3 2.4258 
3 2 3 2.3091 
4 2 4 2.3479 
5 2 5 3.0761 
6 2 6 3.4493 
7 3 4 2.7320 
8 4 5 2.3173 
9 7 5 4.1573 
10 6 7 2.9315 
11 6 7 2.9315 
 
 
Table 4.3 classifies N-1 contingencies based on active power flow performance for the 39-
bus system. Contingencies with a performance index higher than 1 may lead to violations 
in the system. Theses contingencies should be evaluated by an AC power flow. The line 35 
outage is the most important contingency for the system. Its outage leads to overloads in 
line flow of a few remaining lines, as shown in Figure 4.6.  






Figure 4.6 Overloads due to line 35 outage in IEEE 39-bus system 
 
Table 4.4 shows the RMSE values of the 39-bus system for different mode of operation. In 
normal mode of operation, the RMSE has its minimum value indicating that DC power 
flow estimates line flows more accurately in this mode of operation. As shown in the Table 
4.4, the value of the RMSE differs for various contingencies indicating that a DC power 
flow result and accuracy change with the change in system topology and loading condition. 
Although the RMSE has its maximum value for line 35 outage, the accuracy of power flow 
accomplished by a DC power flow is acceptable in comparison with an AC power flow 




Table 4.4 Root mean square error between AC and DC power flow for different contingencies 








35 21 22 16.193 
42 26 27 15.341 
45 28 29 15.138 
25 15 16 13.618 
13 6 11 13.256 
8 4 5 12.977 
10 5 6 12.814 
44 26 29 12.791 
38 23 24 12.723 
28 16 21 12.574 
4 2 25 12.541 
2 1 39 12.533 
43 26 28 12.17 
30 17 18 12.122 
6 3 4 12.022 
12 6 7 12.009 
24 14 15 11.975 
40 25 26 11.956 
18 10 11 11.901 
23 13 14 11.824 
16 8 9 11.568 
9 4 14 11.464 
26 16 17 11.455 
29 16 24 11.453 
3 2 3 11.381 
19 10 13 11.337 
1 1 2 11.33 
11 5 8 11.323 
15 7 8 11.307 
31 17 27 11.3 
7 3 18 11.297 
36 22 23 11.287 
22 12 13 11.007 
21 12 11 10.94 






4.7 Summary  
In this chapter, N-1 contingency analysis is explained. Performance indices are used to 
classify important N-1 contingencies for online contingency analysis. DC power flow 
analysis is used to classify important contingencies. Important contingencies are evaluated 
by AC power flow analysis in detail. Line outage distribution factors (LODFs) are 
formulated. Active power flow performance index is used to classify N-1 contingencies for 
the IEEE 7 and 39 benchmark systems. Contingencies are listed in descending orders based 
on their performance index. A few important contingencies are considered for online 
contingency analysis. The root mean square error index is used to show the difference 
between AC and DC power flow in estimating line active power flows. Based on the 
simulation results, the DC power flow has its best performance compared to the AC power 
flow method in normal mode operation of the system while its results for various 
contingencies are within acceptable range. The root mean square error varies for different 






N-2 Contingency Analysis for Power Systems  
5.1 Introduction 
Transmission lines are highly stressed to cover a continual load growth and to assure an 
economical operation in the deregulated environment. Considering multiple contingencies 
is inevitable in systems with such highly loaded transmission lines. The North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) transmission planning (TPL) introduced new 
standards requiring secure power system operations with multiple line outages to deal with 
such incredibly stressed transmission lines. These standards are intended to ensure the 
reliability of the system in the new deregulated environment [2, 35-39].  
The number of multiple outages is extremely high. Evaluating a huge number of possible 
contingencies faces technical challenges. In online security assessment, predefined 
contingencies, screened as important contingencies that may lead to overloads in the power 
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system, are evaluated by the state estimator model. It takes a longer time to assess a larger 
list of contingencies [35, 36, 38].    
Important N-2 contingencies generated by screening algorithms are processed faster than 
whole double outage contingencies. It is believed that every line outage affects a small 
percentage of other line flows in the system, which means that the number of selected 
contingencies is much smaller than the number of possible contingencies. Evaluating all 
possible N-2 contingencies using AC power flow is far more reliable but unfeasible. 
Identifying critical contingencies in a computationally efficient way is necessary [35, 36].  
This chapter explains the analysis methods for multiple contingencies. Linear distribution 
factors, used for N-1 contingency analysis, are extended to evaluate the N-2 line outages. 
Different contingency screening algorithms are discussed for multiple contingency 
screening. The effectiveness of the methods is examined through a case study.  
5.2 North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Standard 
Planning and operating rules defined by reliability standards are followed by electrical 
utilities ensuring the most possible reliable planning and operation. Table 5.1 clarifies 
different categories for transmission system planning and operation in normal and 
emergency conditions. Based on the transmission planning standards, TPL-001-3, required 
by NERC, the planning authority and transmission planner should each explain that its 
section of the interconnected transmission system is planned in a way that the system can 
supply all demands in all levels under the contingency conditions defined in categories A-
C in Table 5.1[39]. The explanation should be done through a valid assessment annually. 
The assessment should be done for near-term and longer-term and should be validated 
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through current or past system simulation to test the system performance following 
contingencies defined through different categories.  The assessment should address any 
planned required upgrades to meet the contingencies.  
 
Table 5.1 Transmission system standards – Normal and Emergency conditions 
Category Contingencies System Limits or Impacts 





Voltage Limits within 
Applicable Rating 
Loss of Demand  
Or  







All facilities in service Yes No No 
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Event resulting in the 
loss of a single element. 
Single line ground or 3-phase 
fault, with normal cleaning. 
1. Generator 
2. Transmission lines 
3. Transformer 

















Event(s) resulting in the 
loss of two or more 
(multiple) elements. 
- SLG fault, with normal 
clearing: 
1. Bus Section 
2. Breaker (failure or internal 
Fault) 
 
- SLG or 3Ø fault, with 
normal clearing, manual 
system adjustments, followed 
by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, 
with normal clearing: 
3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or 




































system adjustments, followed 
by another Category B (B1, 
B2, B3, or B4) contingency 
 
- Bipolar block, with normal 
clearing: 
4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault 
(non 3Ø), with normal 
clearing: 
5. Any two circuits of a 
multiple circuit tower line 
 
- SLG fault, with delayed 
clearing (stuck breaker or 
protection system failure): 
6. Generator 
7. Transformer 
8. Transmission circuit 













5.3 Multiple Contingency Analysis 
The most accurate but infeasible way of evaluating N-2 outages in a power system is 
accomplishing an AC power flow analysis for every possible N-2 outage in the system. As 
system operational condition is continuously changing due to the change in loads and 
system topology, the number of N-2 outages is extremely high which makes it impossible 
to do online assessment of all N-2 contingencies using AC power flow analysis.  Online 
evaluation of all N-2 contingencies even with a DC power flow analysis is infeasible, in 
contrast with the N-1 contingency analysis, due to the large number of these contingencies.  
The maximum allowed time, considering changes in a power system condition, to evaluate 
contingencies in online application imposes a limit on the number of contingencies 
considered for online assessment. It is necessary and logical to consider a limited number 
of N-2 contingencies for online evaluations since not all of them lead to violation in system 
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constraints. Selecting critical contingencies while filtering unimportant contingencies is a 
very important and challenging task which is done through contingency ranking and 
screening methods.  
Contingency ranking ranks various outages based on post contingent overloads, and 
contingency screening screens important contingencies and ignores unimportant 
contingencies. Line outage distribution factors (LODFs) used to estimate line flows for 
each contingency are a fast and accurate way based on DC power flow analysis. These 
distribution factors and performance indices were used to rank N-1 contingencies in chapter 
four. In this section, the application of LODFs are extended to evaluate N-2 contingencies.  
Linear sensitivities such as line outage distribution factors (LODFs) and power transfer 
distribution factors (PTDFs), obtained from DC power flow analysis and used in N-1 
contingency analysis, have been used to approximate line active power flow changes due 
to multiple line outages. The LODF for line α is defined by (5.1) as a change in active 
power flow on line α as a percentage of the pre-outage flow on line β when the β is 












  (5.1) 
 , ,
 newf f f f d f            (5.2) 
To formulate the LODFs for two outages, the effect of line β and line δ simultaneous 
outages on line α is considered.  These outages affect the flow on line α and each other, as 
well. The altered flows are unknown. By assuming known values for altered flows, a system 
of equations can be written and solved for altered values.  Equation (5.3) explains a system 
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of two equations for new line flows due to line β and line δ outages, one after another, using 
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The flow change on line α due to simultaneous outage of lines β and δ can be calculated 
using (5.7) since the altered flow is known by (5.5). The LODFs for double line outages 
and hence the new line flows, affected by the outages, are calculated using (5.7). Equation 
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 (5.8) 
By definition, LODFs measure the effect of a line outage on the other line flows. Using 
these metrics, the line interactions on each other can be determined effectively. It is 
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believed that a line outage can alter the nearby line flows but does not affect distant line 
flows. Generally, LODFs decrease with an increase in distance from disconnected lines, 
proving the mentioned beliefs, but not for all cases. A line outage has a large impact on a 
distant line flow in the case of islanding in the system that means the outaged line and the 
distant line are connecting two island systems to each other [2, 37, 38]. 
5.4 Contingency Selection Methods for N-2 Line Outages  
A number of contingencies in a system with L branches and K outage elements is given in 
(5.9). The number of contingencies for two element outages, given in (5.10), even a 
moderately sized network is considerably high. For example, a small IEEE 39 bus 
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Evaluating all possible double line outages are both impossible and unnecessary. Therefore, 
contingency classification is necessary for multiple contingency analysis. To classify the 
contingencies, different contingency screening algorithms have been proposed. These 
algorithms try to classify contingencies based on their impact on post contingent line flows. 
A line whose outage will lead to higher violations in system line flows should be ranked as 
a highly critical contingency. The screening algorithm is successful if it selects dangerous 
contingencies without entering a large number of unimportant contingencies into the online 
contingency assessment list.  
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Impact Tracking Structure (ITS) and Overload Tracking Structure (OTS) are two screening 
algorithms proposed for multiple contingency screening in [35]. The ITS algorithm 
considers only sensitivity information, and the OTS algorithm considers line flow and limit 
information, as well. Both screening algorithms have two steps. They are looking at the 
effect of lines on each other, known as track structure, in the first step and are building a 
list of contingencies based on track structure in the second step.  
A) Impact Tracking Structure: 
First, the impact of the lines on each other is identified using LODFs. Every line whose 
outage affects a specific line flow is entered in its list. LODFs define the impact of line 
outages on each other. In ITS, each line has a row which includes lines of the system that 
have related LODFs more than a pre-defined threshold value, called
*d . The threshold value 
defines the size of contingency list. For a higher threshold value, the contingency list has 
smaller entities. If the threshold value is considered zero, the contingency list will include 
all possible contingencies. Based on track structure, every single line outage which has a 












The row for line α, for example, has three entries, lines β, δ, γ, which means that these three 
line outages have a high impact on flow of line α. As shown in the figure, a very sparse 
structure is generated since every line outage affects limited number of line flows. After 
ITS construction, every possible pair is produced for each row of the ITS structure. Every 
double line outages which has an impact on a specific line is identified. The rationale for 
the approach is if each of these lines has a high impact on the determined line flow, probably 
their combinations also would have a high impact on the line flow. The final double line 
outage list is created by removing any non-unique outages. The contingencies on the final 
list are considered as critical double line outages. These contingencies are evaluated using 






B) Overload Tracking Structure:  
 This algorithm uses line flow and line flow limit information beside the system topology 
information used in the ITS algorithm. The OTS uses line flow information instead of just 
using LODFs information. The line flows are estimated by LODFs and compared against 
their emergency rating limits. This makes this algorithm more complicated but very 
accurate. Like ITS overload threshold value,
*o , is used to identify important outages. The 
overload threshold value is a margin from emergency flow limit for a single line outage. 
For example, a threshold value of 10% means that a single line outage resulting in a post 
contingent line flow of 90% of its emergency rate will be considered in the OTS. In this 
algorithm, every line has a row which lists other lines if their outages result in violation in 
its flow based on predefined overload threshold value and its emergency flow limit. Every 
pair of the contingencies in each row with other lines of the system is considered as double 
outages in the OTS. The final double outage contingency list is generated after removing 
repeated contingencies. This method tends to capture more contingencies, and is designed 
to consider a single outage contingencies resulting in violations when they are combined 
with other lines in the system. The concept behind this selection method is that the single 
line outage resulting in violations will contribute to violations when it is a part of double 
line outage in the system [35, 38].   
5.5 Illustration Using an Example  
The IEEE 14 bus system, shown in Fig. 5.1, is used to explain the strengths and weaknesses 
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Figure 5.1 Single line digram for IEEE 14 bus system 
 
Table 5.4 shows the line impacts on each other. The threshold is considered 10 percent. 
Every line has a row, and each row consists of lines which impact that line flow. For 
example, row one in Table 5.4 consists of lines 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, indicating that these lines 
have an impact on line one based on line outage distribution values. Every pair of these 
lines will be considered as important double line outages for line one based on ITS 
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algorithm. That means their outages may lead to a flow violation in line one, and they 
should be examined in online contingency analysis. 
Table 5.4 Impact Track Structure for IEEE 14 bus system 
 
 Table 5.5 explains the ITS algorithm output. The first row shows line numbers, and each 
line has a column consisting of all double lines considered as important outages for that 
specific line. For example, line 1 has a column consisting of double line outages identified 
by ITS algorithm as important outages for line one. Lines (2, 3), (2, 4) ..., (5, 7), and (6, 7) 
shown in the first column of the Table are important double line outages for line number 
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one. In order to examine strengths and weaknesses of the ITS algorithm, all double line 
outages are evaluated by AC power flow, and the result of ITS algorithm is compared with 
that.  
Table 5.5 Important two line outages identified by Impact Track Structure for IEEE 14 bus system  
 
Table 5.6 shows double line outages and corresponding line violations based on full AC 
power flow analysis for all possible double line outages. Column one shows the violated 
lines numbers. Each violated line has a row consisting of double lines whose outages lead 
to a violation in that specific line flow. For instance, the flow on line two violates the line 
thermal limit if any of the following double line outages happens in the system: lines (3,4), 
(3,5), (4,5) and (4,7). The first row explains double lines whose outages lead to a blackout 
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in the system. Table 5.5 identifies important double line outages according to ITS 
algorithm, and Table 5.6 clarifies double line outages which lead to a flow violation in a 
specific line identified by full AC power flow analysis. By comparing these two tables, it 
is possible to show the strengths and weaknesses of the ITS algorithm in identifying 
important double line outages and to understand the reasons behind those characteristics.    
Table 5.6 Double line outages and corresponding violated lines extracted from AC power flow analysis 
 
 
The double line outages which lead to line flow, based on AC power flow analysis, and 
identified by ITS algorithm is highlighted by red colour in Table 5.5. These lines cause 
flow violations and are successfully identified by ITS algorithm. The outaged lines, shown 
in yellow, cause a blackout in the system. The ITS identified them correctly. The remaining 
lines, identified as important lines by the ITS algorithm, do not lead to any line flow 
violations in the system. These lines are identified as important double outages by the 
algorithm and are classified unimportant outages by an AC power flow analysis. For 
example, lines 3 and 4 outages lead to a flow violation in line 2, identified by AC power 
flow analysis and shown in Table 5.6.  This outage is identified as an important outage by 
ITS algorithm as well, shown in Table 5.5. On the other hand, lines 6 and 7 outage is 
identified as an important outage for line 2 by ITS algorithm while this outage is not a 
Blackout 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 10
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 10 15
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 10
2 3 3 4 4
4 5 5 7
3 2 2 4 7
4 5 5 10
4 2 2 3 3 3 7
3 5 5 7 10 10
5 2 2 3
3 4 4
6 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
4 10 11 12 13 14 16 18 19 20 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20
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dangerous outage based on AC power flow. The higher the number of these extra lines, the 
lower the speed of online contingency evaluation.  
Identifying unimportant double line outages as important ones is one of the algorithm’s 
weaknesses. The other issue with this algorithm is that it failed to recognize a few important 
double line outages.  Simultaneous outages of lines 7 and 10 lead to flow violations in lines 
1 and 3. This outage is not identified as an important outage for neither line 1 nor line 3 by 
ITS algorithm. Although this line is considered as an important outage for line 4 and entered 
in online contingency analysis list, the ITS algorithm failed to identify that as an important 
outage for line 1 and 3 as it is supposed to do based on its definition.  It should be mentioned 
that none of the lines 7 and 10 single outage leads to a violation in the system.  
The ITS algorithm fails to identify those double line outages and which one of the line 
outage leads to flow violation in corresponding line. For instance, line 2 outage leads to a 
flow violation in line 1, so almost any pair of other lines with line 2 lead to the flow 
violation in line 1, but this algorithm fails to identify all these outages. Line 3 single outage 
leads to flow violation in lines 4 and 7, and the algorithm is not able to identify all pairs of 
line 3 as important contingencies for neither line 4 nor line 7.  
The main advantage of this algorithm is that it is able to identify double outages which lead 
to violations when both of the lines go out. As examples, line 3 and line 4 outages leading 
to a flow violation in line 2 and line 2 and line 5 outages leading to a flow violation in line 
3 are identified by the algorithm while none of the outage of these lines alone leads to 
violation in the corresponding specific line.  
In order to examine the functionality of the OTS algorithm, all single line outages are 
analysed by AC power flow. The violated lines and lines whose outages lead to a specific 
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line flow violation are identified since the OTS algorithm is built upon single line outage 
violation in the system. Based on AC power flow, the outage of line 1 leads to a blackout 
in the system, and line 2 outage cause a flow violation in line 1. Line 3 outage leads to flow 
violations in line 6 and line 7. A flow in line 7 is violated by line 10 outage as well.   
Table 5.7 Violated and outages lines identified by OTS algorithm 
 
Table 5.7 demonstrates the OTS algorithm output. Column one shows violated lines due to 
single line outages. For any violated line, there is a row which includes every pair of the 
line whose outage leads to a flow violation in that specific line with other lines of the 
system. For instance, line 2 outage leads to a flow violation in line 1, so the corresponding 
row for line 1 includes all pairs of line 2 with other lines of the system.  
Double line outages shown in Table. 5.7, identified as important lines by OTS algorithm, 
are compared to those dangerous double line outages shown in Table 5.6, identified by AC 
power flow, in order to examine the accuracy of the algorithm in identifying important 
double line outages in the system. The double line outages which are correctly identified 
by the OTS algorithm as important contingencies are highlighted and underlined in red 
colour and in Table 5.7. For instance, lines 4 and 10 outage leads to a violation in line 7 
flow is identified correctly by the OTS algorithm. On the other hand, lines 5 and 10 outage 
is identified as an important outage by the algorithm while this outage doesn’t lead to a 
violation in the system based on AC power flow analysis.   
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This algorithm tends to identify double line outages when either of those lines outage leads 
to a violation in the system. On the other hand, the algorithm fails in identifying double line 
outages whose simultaneous outages lead to a violation in the system. For example, 
simultaneous outages of lines 4 and 7 leading to a flow violation in line 4 are not identified 
by this method since neither line 4 nor line 7 single outage leads to any violation in the 
system.  
5.6 Summary 
The N-2 contingency analysis is explained in this chapter. Instead of implementing full AC 
or DC power flow analysis to evaluate every double line outages in the system, which is 
infeasible and unnecessary, contingency screening algorithms are used to identify 
important contingencies for online contingency evaluations.  The impact tracking structure 
(ITS) and overload tracking structure (OTS) algorithms are used to determine important 
double line outages. These methods use line outage distribution factors, line flows, and line 
flow limits to identify contingencies which are further evaluated in detail in online 
contingency analysis. The results of these algorithms in identifying important double line 
outages are compared to those of AC power flow analysis to examine their competencies. 
Based on the simulation, the ITS algorithm acts better in identifying double line outages 
when simultaneous outages lead to a violation in the system and there is no violation when 
any of these lines fails individually. The OTS algorithm has a better performance in 
identifying those double line outages whose any of them individually leads to a violation 
in the system in comparison to the ITS. Both algorithms missed some important double line 




Case Study for Double Line Outages  
6.1 Introduction:  
It this chapter, the studied algorithms for double line outage identification in chapter five 
are examined through a case study. The impact track structure (ITS) and overload track 
structure (OTS) algorithms, explained in chapter five, are used to classify double line 
outages in important and unimportant categories based on line outage distribution factors 
(LODFs), line flows and line thermal limits. Their performance is important since only 
important double line outages identified by the algorithms are evaluated in online 
contingency analysis. Their malfunction will lead to either missing important double line 
outage in the final list or adding unimportant ones to the final list for online contingency 
analysis. The performance of impact track structure (ITS) and overload track structure 






6.2 Case study  
Figure 6.1 shows the 39 bus IEEE benchmark system. It has 46 branches consisting of 34 
transmission lines and 12 transformers. Outages of transformer branches are not analyzed 
in this simulation since their outages stimulate generator outages due to the system 
topology, shown in Fig. 6.1. There are 34 single line outages and 561 double line outages 
in this system. Table 6.1 shows general information for the 39 system [40]. 
Table 6.1 IEEE 39 bus benchmark system 
Number of 






Generations Loads Shunts 
MW MVAr MW MVAr MVAr 








In order to evaluate the results of the ITS and OTS algorithms, all possible N-2 
contingencies are analyzed by both an AC and a DC power flow, and their results are used 
to evaluate the accuracy of the mentioned contingency screening algorithms. The number 
of double line outages leading to a violation in the system is 281 for an AC power flow 
analysis and 274 for a DC power flow analysis. The number of violations due to the double 
line outages is 601 for an AC power flow and 583 for a DC power flow. Lines 9 and 13 
outages lead to flow violation in seven lines of the system. Lines 10 and 12 outage lead to 
a flow violation in five lines, violate line flows of lines 9, 23, and 19 by 194, 192, and 183 
percent of their emergency rating respectively. This outage is the worst case from 
maximum violation point of view. 
6.3 Impact and Overload Track Structure Algorithms 
Table 6.2 shows the results of the impact track structure algorithm for the IEEE 39 bus 
system. For each line of the system, there is a row containing the number of lines which 
have line outage distribution factor higher than the threshold value for the algorithm. The 
LODFs values are shown under the line numbers. The ITS threshold values is considered 
10 percent. For instance, line number one has a row in the table indicating line numbers 
whose outages have high impact on line one flow. The level of the impact is determined by 
LODFs written under the line numbers in the table. Line 27 flow is affected by only its 
outage. Lines 10, 8, 24, 25, and 26 have the longest rows in ITS algorithm showing that 
these lines are affected by a lot of outages in the system. This indicates that these lines are 
either a low resistance path or the only path to the loads while there is an outage in the 









Based on the idea that if the individual outage of two lines has a high impact on a specific 
line’s flow, then simultaneous outages will also have a high impact on that line’s flow, 
every pair of lines is produced for each row. After eliminating repeated and duplicated 
double line outages, the ITS algorithm classified 301 double line outages as important 
outages. These contingencies are considered for online contingency evaluation.  
Table 6.3 shows the results of the overload impact track structure for this system. The 
threshold value is considered to be 5 percent. All single line outages are evaluated by AC 
power flow analysis. Violated lines and lines leading to the violations are identified. Every 
violated line has a row containing line numbers whose outages lead to a flow violation in 
that specific line. The amount of violation in line flow due to each outage is written under 
the outaged line number. For example, line 42 outage causes a flow violation for line 3 by 
116 percent of its emergency limit.  





Every pair of each of these lines that caused a violation in N-1 contingency, with other lines 
of the system is considered as an important contingency in OTS. After eliminating duplicate 
contingencies, the OTS produces 261 double line outages for online contingency 
evaluation.   
It is clear that neither ITS nor OTS can identify all important N-2 contingencies that lead 
to violations in the system, completely, and all contingencies, identified as important 
contingencies by either ITS or OTS, are not N-2 dangerous contingencies. 
6.4 Performance of ITS and OTS algorithms  
 Table 6.4 shows statistics for these screening algorithms. The ITS fails to identify 45.2 
percent of important contingencies while the OTS has a better performance by missing 11.4 
percent of important contingencies.  Meanwhile, the ITS listed unimportant contingency 
by 52 percent of all double outage contingencies while this statistic is 4 percent for OTS. 
As explained through Table. 6.4, the OTS algorithm has a better performance in identify 
important double line outages, and it has a shorter list for online contingency analysis.  
Table 6.4 The statistics for ITS and OTS algorithm performances 
 Compared to full contingency evaluation 
done by an AC power flow 
Screening algorithm Error (%) Extra (%) 
ITS 45.2 52.32 






Conclusion and Future Work  
7.1 Recap of the Thesis  
Electrical energy has penetrated all aspect of human life due to its outstanding features, 
compared to other forms of energy, such as compatibility with environment, efficiency and 
reliability. Large interconnected transmission lines within the countries or even within a 
continent connect loads to generation centers economically, efficiently and reliably. 
Electrical blackout is an inherent nature of any power system. Blackouts have economic, 
social and political consequences, and it is impossible to prevent them from happening. 
Their frequencies and consequences can be contained by investment in power system 
infrastructures and by detail analysis of power systems in steady state and dynamic mode 
of operation.   
Power flow equations are used to model and analyze a power system performance in steady 
state mode of operation. An AC power flow with nonlinear equations is the most accurate 
modeling of the power system in steady state mode. It has convergence difficulties and 
convergence speed limitations which make it non-functional in some applications such as 
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online contingency analysis. On the other hand, a DC power flow with linear equations is 
able to estimate line active power flow with acceptable accuracy. Various DC power flow 
models consider a flat voltage profile of 1 per unit for all buses and ignore reactive power 
conservation of the system. The active power losses of transmission lines are ignored or 
approximated by these models. Various DC power flow performances in estimating line 
active power flows in comparison to an AC power flow are evaluated using root mean 
square error index. It is shown that a DC power flow with single multiplier and zero line 
resistance has a better performance in line active power flow estimation which is essential 
in contingency analysis.   
Contingency analysis is an important tool in power system security analysis. Contingency 
analysis involves evaluating any event that may occur in the future. The power system 
operators and designers should deal with these contingencies and should be prepared for 
them. Through contingency analysis, all single or multiple outages are considered and 
evaluated to predict their consequences in order to carry out preventive and corrective 
actions. N-1 contingency analysis models evaluate any single outages in power systems. 
Evaluating all single outages by an AC power flow is infeasible due to a large number of 
outages. It is unnecessary since not all of the contingencies are credible nor critical. In this 
study, all single outages are evaluated by a DC power flow. Credible contingencies are 
identified by a DC power flow and classified according to their criticality by using 
performance indices. The final list of critical contingencies are evaluated by an AC power 
flow in detail.   
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Transmission Planning 
(TPL) introduced a new standard in place for highly stressed transmission lines in new 
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deregulated networks. Based on the new regulations, double line outages should be 
considered in designing and operating power systems.  The number of N-2 contingencies 
are extremely high for large power systems. Evaluating all N-2 contingencies even with a 
DC power flow is infeasible. Screening algorithms are used to identify important double 
line outages based on line outage distribution factors and N-1 contingency analysis. Impact 
Tracking Structure (ITS) and Overload Tracking Structure (OTS) algorithms are used to 
identify critical double line outages. Their performances are evaluated in detail using case 
studies.  Both of the algorithms failed to identify some important outages while some 
unimportant ones are classified as important double line outages. The ITS is successful in 
identifying those double line outages which lead to violations when both of the lines go out 
simultaneously. The OTS has a better performance in identifying double line outages for 
which an outage of any one line leads to a violation in the system.  
7.2 Summary of the Research and Contribution of the Thesis  
The main contribution of this research can be summarized as follows:  
1.  Various DC power flow models are formulated and studied in detail. Their performances 
in estimating line active power flows are evaluated.  
2.  N-1 contingency analysis and screening by both an AC power flow and a DC power 
flow are investigated. A DC power flow and performance indices application in identifying 
important N-1 contingencies are examined.  
3.  Double line outages are studied by an AC power flow and screening algorithms.  
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4. Impact Tracking Structure (ITS) and Overload Tracking Structure (OTS) screening 
algorithms are studied comprehensively.  Their performances in identifying critical double 
line outages are evaluated completely.   
7.3 Possible Future Research  
Multiple contingency analysis is a demanding area for research. In this study, double line 
outages are investigated in steady state mode of operation in power systems. The following 
areas could be considered for future work in multiple contingency analysis:  
1. Dynamic multiple contingency analysis. 
2. Multiple contingency analysis of the power system with high penetration of renewable 
energy resources.  
3. Multiple contingency analysis using phasor measurement units.  
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Appendix A: The IEEE 7-Bus Power System Data  
The information of 7-bus power system is presented in this appendix. Figure A.1 shows a 
single line diagram of the system. Loads and generations on buses are given in Table A.1. 
Transmission line parameters and power flow limits are shown in Table A.2[24]. The base 
voltage and power are considered 138 𝑘𝑣 and 100 𝑀𝑉𝐴 respectively. 
 
Figure A.1 One line diagram of the 7-bus power system 
 











1   101.85 5.25 
2 40 20 170.08 33.24 
3 110 40   
4 80 30 95.03 19.99 
5 130 40   
6 200 0 200.33 -6.59 




Table A.2 Line data for the 7-bus system 
From Number To Number R X B Limit on MVA  
1 2 0.02 0.06 0.06 150 
1 3 0.08 0.24 0.05 65 
2 3 0.06 0.18 0.04 80 
2 4 0.06 0.18 0.04 100 
2 5 0.04 0.12 0.03 100 
2 6 0.02 0.06 0.05 200 
3 4 0.01 0.03 0.02 100 
4 5 0.08 0.24 0.05 60 
7 5 0.02 0.06 0.04 200 
6 7 0.08 0.24 0.05 200 




Appendix B: The IEEE 14-Bus Power System Data  
The 14-bus system data is presented in this appendix. The single line diagram of the system 
is shown in Figure B.1. Table B.1 contains loads and generation schedule on various buses 
of the system. Table B.2 gives line data of the system. The base voltage and power are 
considered as 138 𝑘𝑣 and 100 𝑀𝑉𝐴 respectively.  
 
Figure B.1 One line diagram of the 14-bus power system 
 
Table B.1 Load demand and generation schedule for the 14-bus system 
Bus Number Load MW Load Mvar Gen MW Gen Mvar 
1   232.39 -16.55 
2 21.7 12.7 40 43.56 
3 94.2 19 0 25.07 
4 47.8 -3.9   
5 7.6 1.6   
6 11.2 7.5 0 12.73 
7     
8   0 17.62 
9 29.5 16.6   
10 9 5.8   
11 3.5 1.8   
12 6.1 1.6   
13 13.5 5.8   
14 14.9 5   
107 
 
Table B.2 Line data for the 14-bus system 
From Number To Number R X B Limit on MVA  
1 2 0.01938 0.05917 0.0528 200 
1 5 0.05403 0.22304 0.0492 100 
2 3 0.04699 0.19797 0.0438 100 
2 4 0.05811 0.17632 0.034 100 
2 5 0.05695 0.17388 0.0346 100 
3 4 0.06701 0.17103 0.0128 100 
4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0 100 
4 7 0 0.20912 0 100 
4 9 0 0.55618 0 100 
5 6 0 0.25202 0 100 
6 11 0.09498 0.1989 0 100 
6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0 100 
6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0 100 
7 8 0 0.17615 0 100 
7 9 0 0.11001 0 100 
9 10 0.03181 0.0845 0 100 
9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0 100 
10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0 100 
12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0 100 





Appendix C: The 39-Bus System Data 
The 39-bus system data is presented in this appendix. The single line diagram of the system 
is shown in Figure C.1. Table C.1 contains loads and generation schedule on various buses 
of the system. Table C.2 gives line data of the system.  
 





Table C.1 Load demand and generation schedule for the 39-bus system 
Bus Number Load MW Load Mvar Gen MW Gen Mvar Act B Shunt 
Mvar 
1 0 0   0 
2 0 0   0 
3 235.51 2.4   0 
4 500 184   112.34 
5 0 0   230.82 
6 0 0   0 
7 233.8 84   0 
8 522 176   0 
9 0 0   0 
10 0 0   0 
11 0 0   0 
12 7.5 88   0 
13 0 0   0 
14 0 0   0 
15 320 153   0 
16 329.4 32.3   0 
17 0 0   0 
18 158 30   0 
19 0 0   0 
20 680 103   0 
21 274 115   0 
22 0 0   0 
23 247.5 84.6   0 
24 308.6 -92.2   0 
25 224 47.2   0 
26 139 17   0 
27 281 75.5   0 
28 206 27.6   0 
29 283.5 26.9   0 
30   250 81.18 0 
31 9.2 4.6 484.65 351.75 0 
32   650 -0.74 0 
33   632 68.87 0 
34   508 148.42 0 
35   650 166.14 0 
36   560 74.94 0 
37   540 -36.1 0 
38   830 -0.99 0 





 Table C.2 Line data for the 39-bus system 
From Number To Number R X B Lim MVA  
1 2 0.0035 0.0411 0.6987 600 
1 39 0.001 0.025 0.75 1000 
2 3 0.0013 0.0151 0.2572 500 
2 25 0.007 0.0086 0.146 500 
2 30 0 0.0181 0 900 
3 18 0.0011 0.0133 0.2138 500 
3 4 0.0013 0.0213 0.2214 500 
4 14 0.0008 0.0129 0.1382 500 
4 5 0.0008 0.0128 0.1342 600 
5 8 0.0008 0.0112 0.1476 900 
5 6 0.0002 0.0026 0.0434 1200 
6 11 0.0007 0.0082 0.1389 480 
6 7 0.0006 0.0092 0.113 900 
7 8 0.0004 0.0046 0.078 900 
8 9 0.0023 0.0363 0.3804 900 
9 39 0.001 0.025 1.2 900 
10 32 0 0.02 0 900 
10 13 0.0004 0.0043 0.0729 600 
10 11 0.0004 0.0043 0.0729 600 
12 13 0.0016 0.0435 0 500 
12 11 0.0016 0.0435 0 500 
13 14 0.0009 0.0101 0.1723 600 
14 15 0.0018 0.0217 0.366 600 
15 16 0.0009 0.0094 0.171 600 
16 24 0.0003 0.0059 0.068 600 
16 21 0.0008 0.0135 0.2548 600 
16 19 0.0016 0.0195 0.304 600 
16 17 0.0007 0.0089 0.1342 600 
17 27 0.0013 0.0173 0.3216 600 
17 18 0.0007 0.0082 0.1319 600 
19 33 0.0007 0.0142 0 900 
19 20 0.0007 0.0138 0 900 
20 34 0.0009 0.018 0 900 
21 22 0.0008 0.014 0.2565 900 
22 35 0 0.0143 0 900 
22 23 0.0006 0.0096 0.1846 600 
23 36 0.0005 0.0272 0 900 
23 24 0.0022 0.035 0.361 600 
25 37 0.0006 0.0232 0 900 
25 26 0.0032 0.0323 0.513 600 
26 29 0.0057 0.0625 1.029 600 
26 28 0.0043 0.0474 0.7802 600 
26 27 0.0014 0.0147 0.2396 600 
28 29 0.0014 0.0151 0.249 600 
29 38 0.0008 0.0156 0 1200 





Published Papers  
Conference papers 
Y. Salami, B. Jeyasurya, “A Comprehensive Evaluation of “DC” Power Flow Models and 
their Application to Power System Security Analysis,” in 2016 CIGRE Canada 
Conference, Vancouver, BC, Oct. 2016, pp. 1–8. 
 
Y. Salami, T. Iqbal, B. Jeyasurya, “Dynamic Modeling and Grid Impact of an Existing 
Wind Farm in Ardabil, Iran.” In Twenty-Fifth Annual Newfoundland Electrical and 




Y. Salami, B. Jeyasurya, “Contingency Analysis in Power Systems,” in Annual Research 
Posters Memorial University, Mar. 2016. 
 
Y. Salami, B. Jeyasurya, “N-2 Contingency Analysis in Power Systems,” in Annual 
Research Posters Memorial University, April. 2017. 
 
